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Abstract—The interest in trust-based routing protocols has grown 
with the advancements achieved in ad-hoc wireless networks. 
However, regardless of the many security approaches and trust 
metrics available, trust-based routing still faces some security 
challenges, especially with respect to privacy.  In this paper, we 
propose a novel trust-based routing protocol based on a fully 
homomorphic encryption scheme. The new protocol allows nodes, 
which collaborate in a dynamic environment, to evaluate their 
knowledge on the trustworthiness of specific routes and securely 
share this knowledge.           
Keywords-privacy; security; i-hop homomorphic encryption; 
trust-based routing; Ad-hoc wireless network  
I.  INTRODUCTION 
An ad-hoc wireless network is a set of dynamic nodes 
connected to each other without any physical liaison or pre-
conceived infrastructure. This technology, which is suitable for 
dynamic topologies, has attracted a valuable attention from the 
research community. Researchers have discussed the various 
aspects of realizing a strong, dynamic architecture that matches 
its counterpart based on some configured parameters. In this 
context, routing protocols receive the utmost priority since they 
deal with the paths traversed by packets in dynamic networks.   
Routing in ad-hoc wireless networks relies on the 
collaboration of nodes to forward a packet from its source to a 
targeted destination. However, if insufficient security measures 
are implemented, the forwarding functionality may be easily 
compromised by selfish/malicious nodes that mislead 
legitimate nodes to forward packets away from their designated 
destination. Clearly, nodes tend to collaborate with only 
legitimate (honest) nodes to achieve high rates of packet 
delivery. In this context, an interesting approach has been 
proposed [1] to avoid forwarding packets over untrustworthy 
paths. With this approach, each node evaluates its neighbors to 
elect the ones that it will collaborate with. A trust value is 
assigned to each node based on its cooperation. This value is 
updated continuously. The trust values are then used to define a 
trust route. This approach suffers from a major limitation. 
Basically, no special measures are taken to protect the trust 
values generated by the evaluating node. This is a sensitive 
piece of information that should be hidden from malicious 
nodes. Therefore, we focus in this work on providing protective 
measure that can preserve the privacy of nodes without 
degrading the robustness in performance. We utilize the 
concept of Fully Homomorphic Encryption and Multi-hop 
Homomorphic to achieve our goal. 
The Fully Homomorphic Encryption (FHE) is an efficient 
concept that can enable the manipulation of encrypted data in a 
blind fashion. FHE schemes allow performing algebraic 
computations such as addition and multiplication, unlike other 
schemes which support only a single type of operations 
(addition or multiplication) [12-15]. This capability provides a 
high level of flexibility and makes it possible to publish 
encrypted data as well as delegate encrypted data processing to 
third parties. This proves beneficial for packets routing, since 
each node can perform its trust circuit and then communicate, 
to its neighbors, the resulting trust evaluation in an encrypted 
format. This way, nodes can effectively protect their privacy. It 
is worth mentioning, however, that the FHE concept is 
bounded by the number of circuits that can participate in a 
certain computation. This is can be understood by noticing that 
in the output of a circuit, the resulting ciphertext is no fresher 
as it was in entry, and therefore, FHE properties might be no 
more valid. To overcome this limitation, we use a mechanism 
called the "Adapter", which implements a multi-hop concept to 
preserve the FHE properties, even when multiple hops are 
involved. Such a mechanism allows us to develop an efficient 
and secure trust-based routing protocol for ad-hoc wireless 
networks.  
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In 
Section II we review the related work to the area of trust-based 
routing protocols. Section III provides an overview of routing 
techniques as well as their limitations. Section IV presents our 
novel trust-based routing protocol. Section V details the 
solution and describes the designed protocol. Section VI we 
study the performance of our new protocol. Finally, Section 
VII concludes our work and provides future research 
directions. 
II. RELATED WORK 
In this section, we briefly describe other works that aim at 
defining trust mechanisms or designing secure routing 
protocols in ad-hoc wireless networks. 
Pirzada et al. define a trust mechanism [1] for a reactive 
routing protocol. They propose a model in which each node in 
an ad-hoc wireless environment maintains an evaluation 
procedure to reward or punish nodes in future collaborations.  
The evaluation generates trust values, which are based on 
transactions’ history and the forwarding quality, that are shared 
with other nodes to choose a trust path. However, the proposal 
in [1] does not employ any measures to protect the evaluations 
conducted by the nodes and any malicious node can access 
these trust values and harm the routing functionality.  
Nekkanti and Lee propose in [2] a trust-based adaptive 
routing protocol that denies nodes which are not affected to 
access route information about routes' path. Furthermore, this 
contribution proposes a mechanism that uses different kinds of 
encryptions that vary according to the nature of nodes and their 
trust level. These techniques are employed to protect the route 
privacy and to save energy without affecting the performance.  
Chou et al. in [3] adopt a trust-based reputation mechanism 
for the reactive routing protocol DSR. This contribution 
proposes a model that detects malicious and selfish nodes in 
order to prevent them from participating in the routing process. 
Sanzgiri et al. in [4] propose a secure routing protocol 
based on authentication mechanisms.  
Zhang et al. in [5] provide a formal study of trust-based 
routing in ad-hoc wireless networks. The work discusses 
several aspects related to these protocols, such as correctness, 
respecting optimal trajectory to construct paths, and distributive 
of trust branches.  
Although the abovementioned contributions provide 
important discussions that tackle various aspects of trust-based 
routing protocols, none of them has addressed the support of 
privacy in these protocols. We focus on this problem in this 
paper. 
III. TRUST BASED ROUTING PROTOCOL 
A. Routing protocol 
Routing protocols define mechanisms by which a router 
finds the paths over which packets are sent to reach their 
targeted destination. These protocols define routing rules, 
manage priorities, and report any changes faced by the nodes. 
Routing protocols can be categorized as static (pro-active) 
protocols or dynamic (reactive) protocols. Static routing 
depends on a pre-configured set of routes that are ready for use 
by the nodes to deliver packets to their destinations. Moreover, 
pro-active protocols discover routes on-demand by sending 
Route Request packets over the network. Dynamic routing, 
however, constructs the route depending on dynamic protocols 
that update the routing rules based on the network’s changing 
conditions. Both of these techniques have strengths and 
weaknesses, depending on the adopted network topology. 
Since, it is sometimes possible to overlook limitations of the 
Reactive protocol to achieve exact routing and better 
administration. Whereas in other architecture, where flexibility 
and dynamic raise as an important factor, Reactive protocol is 
the favorite.        
B. Wireless Ad-Hoc Network 
A wireless ad-hoc network is constituted by a standalone 
architecture that is infrastructure-less, with no specific topology 
pre-defined. The nodes form the network by collaborating 
dynamically to construct on-demand paths that are traversed by 
packets. Ad hoc wireless networks find a broad range of 
applications in environments where minimal configuration and 
quick deployment are required. These networks are a typical 
example where reactive routing protocols are highly preferred 
and effective.  However, routing in ad hoc wireless networks 
faces major challenges in terms of quality and delivery 
guarantees. This is because of that the nodes in these networks 
cooperate and voluntarily announce their availability in order 
for the forwarding of packets to function properly. Therefore, 
the routing functionality can fail drastically when a malicious 
node manages to collude with other nodes to control the 
network, or when some nodes refuse to collaborate to save their 
energy. As a result, the selection of nodes that participate in the 
routing process should be done carefully such that a secure and 
protected environment can be achieved. This proves the 
importance of developing trust-based routing protocols that 
select the nodes based on their level of commitment.   
C. Trust-Based Routing 
The concept of trust-based routing implies that the routing 
functionality selects the nodes based on their involvement and 
degree of faithfulness. The trust factor can be quantified based 
on nodes’ cooperation history and reputation. This history can 
be constructed by monitoring nodes’ availability, level of 
successful packet transfer, and preservation of packets’ 
priority. Based on this history, a trust value is assigned to each 
node by its predecessors, which facilitates the forming of a 
trusted path to forward packets over. However, available trust-
based routing protocols do not take precautions to protect the 
process of evaluating nodes. This means that we need to hide 
the criteria used to assess nodes’ trustworthiness in order to 
prevent malicious nodes from compromising the routing 
functionality. It is the main objective of this paper to protect the 
privacy of nodes and allow them to share their experiences 
safely.  
IV. HOMOMORPHIC ENCRYPTION SCHEMES 
A. Fully homomorphic encryption scheme 
The concept of Homomorphic encryption allows 
performing arithmetic operations over encrypted values. 
Homomorphic encryption schemes have seen major progresses, 
starting from supporting either addition (using additive 
homomorphic encryption) or multiplication (using 
multiplicative homomorphic encryption), and ending with the 
ability to perform both operations based on a fully 
homomorphic encryption scheme (proposed by Gentry [11]). 
Gentry’s scheme achieves effective data protection since a 
client can publish the data in an encrypted format and delegate 
to other parties the processing of that data without decrypting 
them. This scheme can still guarantee a successful decryption 
of the data after applying several arithmetic operations over its 
encrypted format.  
  Gentry’s scheme is a polynomial public key encryption 
scheme which can be designed as   ε୮୩ሺmሻ ൌ c ൌ  m ൅ 2r ൅
pk כ Q , where m is a bit value, r is a random integer, Q is the 
security number and pk is the public key. The combination of 
these elements results in c, which is an encrypted integer form 
of m.  The decryption is simply retrieved by computing m ൌ
 c % sk % 2 , where sk  is the secret key. The length of the 
ciphertext is based on a security parameter called λ, which is 
employed to define pk as an odd λଷ-bit number, besides  r (a λ-
bit number) and Q  (a λଶ -bit number). Consequently, each 
encrypted bit is determined in at most ൫1 ൅ Logଵ଴ሺPሻ൯ decimal 
digits, where P is a λହ-bit number. The Homomorphic circuit 
can then accept the encrypted values and successfully apply a 
set of operations over them. These operations generate new 
  
encrypted values that can be decrypted only by the party 
owning the secret key sk, see Figure1. 
Figure 1.  Processing ecnrypted data. 
Although the scheme suffers from some drawbacks, like 
supporting only a limited number of operations and being time-
consuming, it is a novel and ingenious approach of 
cryptography that can provide great added values to security 
support. To understand the full potential of Gentry’s scheme it 
is important to establish a set of important concepts, like 
double encryption, homomorphism using different keys, and 
multi-hop encryption. The latter is the main focus of our study. 
Multi-hop encryption enables the processing of encrypted 
entries using different sequenced circuits, see Figure 2. The 
output ciphertext of this circuit, however, is not as fresh as it 
was at the entry, and there are no guarantees that a correct 
decrypted data can be generated from this ciphertext. 
Therefore, we need to propose an alternative scheme that can 
perform a fully homomorphic encryption in a multi-hop 
environment.  
Figure 2.  Multi-hop encryption. 
B. Multi-hop Fully Homomorphic Encryption Scheme 
Gentry et al. [6] discussed the aforementioned problem in 
the case of double encryption, and proposed a solution based 
on the Secure Function Evaluation [7] and Yao’s Garbled 
circuit [8]. This solution consists of extending the principle of 
two-party computation to support the i -hop homomorphic 
encryption scheme for a fixed integer i. Recall that two-party 
computation allows performing a circuit with Heterogeneous 
inputs. Namely, a server Bob who owns a circuit ܥ  can 
combine his input ݔ (known) with another input y (unknown) 
to execute his circuit for these values, while ignoring the exact 
value of ݕ and without revealing the value of its input x. This 
technique arises as a typical solution of the Millionaires’ 
problem that aims at deciding who is richest without revealing 
the wealth of both participants. On the other hand, the fact that 
Gentry relies on such a mechanism to fix the i-hop theory is 
discouraging as far as it is promising. This is because of that 
the solution inherits all the drawbacks of Yao’s garbled 
circuits, such as pre-calculating the whole circuit, transferring 
the whole truth table from one circuit to another, and being 
time-consuming. The advantage of Gentry’s scheme, however, 
is that it is suitable for a topology that uses multiple circuits 
with different public keys.  
In our contribution, we have a slight difference compared to 
Gentry’s scheme in [6]. We utilize only one public key, and all 
circuits conduct their computation based on the same shared 
key. We therefore propose a simplified technique to preserve 
the Fully Homomorphic Encryption properties in a multi-hop 
topology.  
The main difficulty experienced in an environment 
containing multiple circuits is that a module ܥଵ  acts on the 
initial fresh ciphertext sent by the client, and outputs a 
processed one. The latter is then sent to another module ܥଶ and 
so on. However, in most cases the processed ciphertext does 
not preserve the same properties as the fresh one at the first 
entry, and does not suit exactly what a circuit attends from its 
predecessor. Therefore, we introduce a novel mechanism called 
the “Adapter” that allows us to transform and customize an 
output to a set of gates suiting the input of the next circuit. In 
particular, when a circuit finishes its processing, and before 
forwarding the output to the next circuit, it checks how many 
entries the following circuit is requiring. Then, it uses the 
"Adapter" to redraw the output to be exactly what the next 
circuit needs. This way the client’s input is processed using 
multiple modules that form a single chain with several links, 
see Figure 3. 
Figure 3.  Multi-hop architecture using the Adapter concept. 
C. The Adapter 
The use of the Adapter allows us to transform a set of gates 
to a new sequence while keeping the same functionality. The 
Adapter enables us to realize a homogeneous multi-hop 
homomorphic encryption by adapting the output of each circuit 
to be suitable for the next circuit. The use of the Adapter, 
however, may violate the privacy since an equivalent part of a 
circuit is shared with the next circuit. The latter behavior can 
disclose important circuits' characteristics. To avoid this 
violation of privacy, we use another type of logical gates called 
the “Star”. The Star, which we proposed in [9], encrypts 
ordinary gates to hide the operation they implement (“AND” or 
“XOR”). The Star gate accepts three encrypted bit values, 
namely, two operands and a flag, which configures the novel 
operator to be either an “AND” or an “XOR” gate. Thus, a 
circuit based on the Star gates creates a black box that protects 
circuit’s privacy and makes the “Adapter” technique more 
secure.  
To benefit from the strengths of the Star gate, we propose 
to view all of the circuits as a set of interrelated Star gates. This 
approach enables all of these circuits to protect their processing 
and easily map each circuit’s outputs to its next input. This way 
we manage to realize the Adapter concept without disclosing 
any sensitive data to the public. As a result, the afore 
mentioned problem of privacy that is associated with the 
Adapter concept is overcome.  
 V. ENCRYPTED TRUST BASED ROUTING PROTOCOL 
In this section we introduce a novel mechanism that 
computes paths between nodes based on a trust metric and the 
multi-hop homomorphic mechanism. We assume that a routing 
algorithm is used to compute the routes prior to the 
establishment of a trusted path to destination nodes. We further 
assume that the factors to measure the level of nodes’ 
trustworthiness are already known. In the assumed topology, 
each node maintains a trust database that includes a summary 
of all transactions conducted by neighboring nodes. The 
database associates a trust value with each monitored node.  
In our protocol the source node begins by generating both 
public and secret keys, which are used as bases for the multi-
hop homomorphic encryption scheme. Then, the source node 
executes its trust circuit and calculates the trust value for each 
neighboring node. The node with the highest trust value is the 
one to be selected as part of the trusted path. Also, the source 
node generates a Route Request (RR) packet that carries 
information about the public key, the destination node and next 
hop. Moreover, the current element checks the number of 
inputs required by the next hop and transforms its output using 
the “Adapter” to a set of encrypted values. These values 
represent wires that should be used by the next collaborator, 
where each three values form one Star gate. After that, the 
source node maps the generated gates to the RR packet, which 
will also carry the encrypted trust value of the most trusted next 
hop node. The RR is then forwarded to its next hop to continue 
discovering the trusted path. Each node receiving the RR firstly 
verifies whether the destination is among their in-nodes. If the 
destination is found, the RR is forwarded without making any 
changes to it. Otherwise, the current node begins by 
dismantling the received packet and extracting the public key 
and the encrypted accumulated trust value. Thereafter, the node 
retrieves the set of gates sent by the previous node, and links 
them to its circuit to continue calculating the trust path. Then, it 
changes the contents of the RR by mapping a trusted next hop. 
Also, the node updates the accumulated trust value for the 
constructed path as well as the output of “Adapter” mechanism. 
The RR is then transmitted to the next node. The protocol 
continues with this procedure until reaching the destination 
node. Upon receiving the RR packet, the destination replies 
back with a Route Reply (RP) packet to the source. The RP 
carries both the whole path from source to destination, besides 
the encrypted trust value associated with that path. The source 
node is the only entity that is able to decrypt the received trust 
value, without being aware of the one associated to each arc. 
Figure 4.  Accumulating encrypted trust value “T” from source to destination. 
VI. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION 
In this section we discuss the performance of the proposed 
protocol. The performance of our system is highly dependent 
on the parameter of security λ; the bigger this parameter is the 
more secure the system becomes. However, as λ gets bigger, 
the system will have to execute more operations.  
We study an ad hoc network of 20 nodes that need to select 
trusted paths to send their packets over. Each node in this 
topology first needs to evaluate its in-neighbors, and then 
updates the available trust values before forwarding the packet. 
This trust value, which varies from 1 (lowest trust level) to 10 
(highest trust level), can be represented in 4 bits. The encrypted 
form of this value is at the order of 4 ൈ λ ହ bits. Each node 
participating in the protocol should perform 20 additions and 8 
multiplications (homomorphic operations over encrypted 
values) to update the previous trust value. This means, in order 
to calculate a path in a network of 20 nodes, we need to 
compute at most 400 additions and 160 multiplications. To 
guarantee faster computations, we rely on Karatsuba algorithm 
[16], which is suitable for operations over big integers. This 
algorithm allows performing more than 10ଽ integer operations 
in less than one second (tested on a PC with a 6 GB of RAM 
memory at a security parameter λ ൌ 3).  
We show in Table 1, the time needed to compute an 
encrypted trust path under different values of λ, in a network of 
20 nodes.  
TABLE I.  TIME NEEDED TO COMPUTE ENCRYPTED TRUST PATHS 
Security 
Parameter 
ૃ 
Time in Seconds 
3 0.3 
5 1 
8 3 
10 8 
 
VII. CONCLUSION AND PERSPECTIVES 
In this paper, we aimed at developing a secure trust-based 
routing protocol using the concept of multi-hop homomorphic 
encryption. We propose a model that realizes multi-hop 
encryption in an environment using one encryption layer. This 
model is used to realize a secure routing protocol that computes 
trusted paths based on the behavior of neighboring nodes over a 
period of time. Our protocol uses a fully homomorphic 
encryption scheme to protect the privacy of each node while 
evaluating its trustworthiness.    
As a future work, we plan to devise a fully scheme that 
hides the source and destination nodes while computing the 
trusted path.   
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